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A FEDERAL APPELLATE SYSTEM FOR THE TWENTY-
FIRST CENTURY 
Carl Tobias* 
Abstract: In December 1998, the Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal 
Courts of Appeals issued a report and recommendations for Congress and the President. The 
commission resulted from ongoing controversy over splitting the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit The commissioners clearly suggested that the circuit remain intact but 
proposed three regionally based adjudicative divisions for the appeals court. However, the 
commission did not adduce persuasive empirical evidence that the Ninth Circuit experiences 
difficulties that are sufficiently problematic to warrant treatment, particularly with the 
essentially untested divisional arrangement Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit should continue to 
experiment with promising measures. 
The Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of 
Appeals recently issued its report on the intermediate appellate courts 
and recommendations for their improvement and submitted the report 
and suggestions to Congress and the President. 1 This commission, which 
Congress authorized the Chief Justice of the United States to appoint a 
year ago, had an invaluable opportunity to assess the appeals courts and 
develop helpful proposals for change and, thus, to influence appellate 
justice as the twenty-first century opens. The commission resulted from 
lengthy, continuing controversy over the advisability of dividing the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The commissioners clearly and 
strongly rejected the idea of splitting the Ninth Circuit and endorsed the 
alternative of creating adjudicative divisions for the Ninth Circuit now 
and for the remaining circuits as they increase in size. 
The publication of the commission's report and recommendations is 
significant because the appeals courts are at a critical juncture. The 
federal appellate system has served Congress, the federal courts, and the 
nation very well for more than a century. However, the circuits have 
experienced a striking increase in appeals, which has transformed the 
courts since the 1970s; this crisis of volume could threaten the system. 
* Professor of Law, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada, Las Vegas. I wish to 
thank Peggy Sanner for valuable suggestions and Eleanor Davison for processing this piece. Errors 
that remain are mine. 
1. Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals, Final Report (Dec. 
1998), available in <http://app.comm.uscourts.govJfinaYappstruc.pdf> [hereinafter Commission 
Report]. 
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The independent, expert nature of the commission and the time and 
care that it devoted to evaluating the intermediate appellate courts meant 
that the commission's report and suggestions would enjoy the respect, or 
at least receive deference from, many members of the federal judiciary 
and of Congress. Some senators have scrutinized the commission's 
report and proposals and introduced bills that would implement the 
entity's recommendations.2 Several members of Congress from the West, 
who agreed to the study as a compromise and perhaps as a condition 
precedent to dividing the Ninth Circuit, might well offer measures that 
would split the court now that the commissioners have rejected this 
possibility. The ultimate impact of the report remains unclear, but it will 
apparently be substantial. 
All of the factors examined above mean that the recently issued 
report and suggestions of the Commission on Structural Alternatives 
for the Federal Courts of Appeals warrant analysis. This Article 
undertakes that effort by assessing the commission's report and finds 
that several of its proposals deserve implementation but require circuit-
specific experimentation and evaluation to insure effective system-wide 
reform. Part I of the Article explores the origins and development of 
the commission. Part II then traces the entity's efforts in compiling its 
report and recommendations. Part III analyzes the commission's report 
and suggestions. Part IV offers recommendations for the future. 
I. THE COMMISSION'S ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT 
The history of the Commission on Structural Alternatives for the 
Federal Courts of Appeals is important because the intense debate and 
divergent views that led to the commission's establishment may have 
affected the final report and could shape Congress's response to it.3 
Comprehensive treatment is required because this kind of evaluation 
should improve understanding of the report and suggestions that the 
commission recently completed. For instance, it is important to 
appreciate that a House-Senate Conference Committee approved the 
2. S. 253, 106th Cong. ( 1999); S. 186, 106th Cong. ( 1999). 
3. Some features of the commission's background have been chronicled elsewhere. See, e.g., Carl 
Tobias, An Analysis of Federal Appellate Court Study Commissions, 74 Denv. U. L. Rev. 65 (1996); 
see also Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Reorganization Act of 1995, S. Rep. No. 104-197 (1995) 
[hereinafter Senate Report]. See generally Thomas E. Baker, On Redrawing Circuit Boundaries: 
Why the Proposal to Divide the United States Court of Appeals far the Ninth Circuit Is Not Such a 
Good Idea, 22 Ariz. St. L.J. 917 ( 1990). 
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national study as a replacement for an appropriations rider that would 
have bifurcated the Ninth Circuit.4 The commission, therefore, resulted 
from diverse legislative developments and a compromise struck by 
members of Congress with quite different perspectives. Moreover, the 
commission's charge was rather unclear and general, leaving many 
parameters of the analysis to commission discretion. 
A. General Background 
Congress instituted the modern appellate system with the 1891 
passage of the Circuit Court of Appeals Act, legislation that was 
popularly known as the Evarts Act.5 Lawmakers thereafter created two 
new appellate courts and realigned the boundaries of two regional 
circuits. In 1948, Congress expressly recognized the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia Circuit, which resolves numerous cases 
challenging federal administrative agency determinations.6 In 1982, 
Congress established the Federal Circuit and assigned the court national 
jurisdiction over appeals that principally involve customs, patents, 
trademarks, copyrights, and claims against the United States. 7 
The initial circuit realignment occurred relatively early in the history 
of the system. In 1929, senators and representatives created the Tenth 
Circuit Court of Appeals by extracting Colorado, Kansas, New Mexico, 
Oklahoma, Utah, and Wyoming from the Eighth Circuit and leaving 
Arkansas, Iowa, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, and 
4. See Commission Report supra note 1, at 34; see also Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 305(a), 111 Stat 
2491, 2491-92 (1997); S. 1022, 105th Cong.§ 305 (1997). 
5. Circuit Court of Appeals Act, ch. 517, 26 Stat 826 (1891) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 41-49 (1994)). See generally Felix Frankfurter & James Landis, The Business of the Supreme 
Court: A Study in the Federal Judicial System 103-28 (1928). I rely in Part I.A on Carl Tobias, The 
Impoverished Idea of Circuit-Splitting, 44 Emory LJ. 1357 (1995). 
6. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 41, 62 Stat 869, 870 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 41 
(1994)); see also Patricia M. Wald, Life on the District of Columbia Circuit: Literally and 
Figuratively Halfway Between the Capitol and the White House, 72 Minn. L. Rev. 1 (1987); Colloquy, 
The Cantributions of the D.C. Circuit to Administrative Law, 40 Admin. L. Rev. 507 (1988). · 
7. Act of Apr. 2, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat 25 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 41 
(1994)). See generally Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Symposium, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in 
Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1 (1989); United States Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit Tenth Anniversary Commemorative Issue, 41 Am. U. L. Rev. 559 (1992). 
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South Dakota in that court.8 Congress authorized the new Tenth Circuit 
to address increasing caseloads in the Eighth Circuit.9 
Docket growth did not become a systemic complication until the 
1960s when Congress began to enlarge federal court jurisdiction 
dramatically. Lawmakers prescribed many new civil actions and 
criminalized much activity, and this legislation promoted a 200% annual 
increase in appellate filings between 1975 and 1995.10 Congress approved 
numerous new appellate court judgeships; however, it did not authorize 
enough additional judges to address the large number of increasingly 
complicated civil and criminal cases that litigants appealed. 11 Each circuit 
has treated mounting dockets by restricting the written decisions and oral 
arguments it affords and by relying more substantially on support staf£ 12 
The appeals courts vary significantly, nevertheless. All the circuits have 
encountered growing caseloads, but the courts have done so during 
different periods, at diverse rates, and with varying resources and 
measures to address dockets. 13 
Federal judges' concerns about the rising number of appeals prompted 
Congress to establish the Commission on Revision of the Federal Court 
Appellate System (Hruska Commission) in 1972.14 This commission 
thoroughly analyzed the circuits and proposed that Congress split the two 
biggest appeals courts, the Fifth and the Ninth Circuits, rather than 
proffering a more comprehensive approach, such as reconfiguration of 
the entire system's boundaries. 15 The commission was reluctant to 
8. Act of Feb. 28, 1929, ch. 363, 45 Stat. 1346, 1347 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §41 
(1994)). 
9. See Baker, supra note 2, at 923-24. See generally Arthur J. Stanley & Irma S. Russell, The 
Political and Administrative History of the United States Court of Appeals/or the Tenth Circuit, 60 
Denv. L.J. 119, 124-28 (1983). 
10. Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals, H.R. Rep. No. 105-
26, at I (1997). [hereinafter House Report]. 
11. See id. 
12. See, e.g., 8th Cir. R. 34A; 11th Cir. R. 36; see also Arthur D. Hellman, Central Staff in 
Appellate Courts: The Experience of the Ninth Circuit, 68 Cal. L. Rev. 937, 938-40 (1980); Carl 
Tobias, The New Certiorari and a National Study of the Appeals Courts, 81 Cornell L. Rev. 1264, 
1267-68 (1996). 
13. See Carl Tobias, Some Cautions About Structural Overhaul of the Federal Courts, 51 U. 
Miami L. Rev. 389, 395 (1997) (citing multiple sources). 
14. Act of Oct. 13, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-489, 86 Stat. 807; see also Commission on Revision of 
the Federal Court Appellate System, The Geographical Boundaries of the Several Judicial Circuits: 
Recommendations far Change, 62 F.R.D. 223 (1973) [hereinafter Hruska Commission]. 
15. Hruska Commission, supra note 14, at 228. 
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disturb institutions that enjoyed the loyalty and respect of their 
constituents and to disrupt the sense of community that judges and 
attorneys had seemingly developed within the appellate courts.16 
The Hruska Commission grounded its recommendation that Congress 
divide the Fifth and Ninth Circuits on general criteria respecting 
alignment.17 Congress created the Eleventh Circuit b-y rem0-ving Alabama, 
Florida, and Georgia from the Fifth Circuit and leaving Louisiana, 
Mississippi, and Texas in that court. 18 Congress divided the Fifth Circuit 
because of its size in terms of geography, population, caseloads and 
judgeships and because the court's active judges agreed on bifurcation.19 
The Hruska Commission's suggestion that Congress split California and 
reassign its district courts to two different circuits was not predicted and 
was highly controversial; thus, the idea delayed serious legislative 
consideration of the Ninth. Circuit's division during the 1970s.20 
Multiple evaluations of the federal courts preceded the study 
undertaken by the Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal 
Courts of Appeals. Some non-governmental entities, including the 
American Bar Association (ABA), conducted assessments of the appeals 
courts after th.e Hruska Commission had concluded its analysis.21 In 
1988, Congress empowered the Federal Courts Study Committee, an 
independent group consisting of respected members of Congress and the 
judiciary as well as practicing lawyers, to evaluate the federal courts and 
develop suggestions for improvement.22 This entity determined that the 
circuits had encountered a crisis of volume that had dramatically altered 
16. Id. 
17. The standards provided that: (1) at least three states would constitute circuits; (2) appeals 
courts should not be established that would immediately require more than nine judges; (3) circuits 
ought to include states that have diverse populations, legal business, and socio-economic interests; 
(4) realignment should not unduly interfere with existing appellate court boundaries; and (5) appeals 
courts should consist of contiguous states. Hruska Commission, supra note 14, at 231-32. 
18. Act of Oct 14, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96452, 94 Stat 1994 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. 
§ 41 (1994)). See generally H.R. Rep. No. 96-1390, at 1, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4236; 
Baker, supra note 3, at 925-28. 
19. See Baker, supra note 3, at 927. 
20. Hruska Commission, supra note 14, at 234-35; Arthur D. Hellman, Legal Problems of 
Dividing a State Between Federal Judicial Circuits, 122 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1188 (1974). 
21. American Bar Assoc. Standing Comm. on Federal Judicial Improvements, The United States 
Courts of Appeals: Reexamining Structure and Process After a Century of Growth, reprinted in 125 
F.R.D. 523, 542-44 (1989) [hereinafter ABA Report]. See generally Thomas E. Baker, Rationing 
Justice on Appeal 39-40 (1994). 
22. See Report of the Federal Courts Study Committee (1990) [hereinafter Courts Study]; see also 
Federal Courts Study Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, §101, 102 Stat 4642, 4644 (1988). 
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them during the preceding quarter-century.23 The Committee found that 
"more fundamental change" seemed inevitable, unless appellate workloads 
decreased, a prospect that appeared remote. 24 The Committee canvassed 
five fundamental structural measures for addressing caseload growth to 
promote future inquiry and discussion among the federal government's 
branches and attorneys, but it endorsed none of the alternatives.25 The 
entity also urged Congress to authorize a five-year study of the appellate 
court dockets and structural options for treating appeals.26 
Lawmakers failed to approve the Federal Courts Study Committee's 
proposed evaluation but did require that the Federal Judicial Center 
(FJC) conduct an analysis of structural alternatives, which the FJC 
finished in 1993.27 The FJC found that the regional circuits were 
confronting stress that structural changes would not "significantly 
relieve."28 The Long Range Planning Committee of the Judicial 
Conference of the United States also concluded a rather comprehensive 
examination of the federal courts and published a final report in March 
1995.29 The Committee essentially disfavored realigning appellate courts, 
and it assessed the possibilities of according district judges greater 
appellate responsibilities and reducing the size of appeals court panels.30 
None of these assessments, however, prompted legislative action to 
modify the federal appellate court system. 
B. Ninth Circuit 
Recent congressional developments regarding the possible division of 
the Ninth Circuit warrant comparatively comprehensive examination 
here because they eventually resulted in legislative approval of the 
23. Courts Study, supra note 22, at 109. 
24. Seeid. 
25. Id. at 116-23; see also Tobias, supra note 5, at 1396-1400. 
26. Courts Study, supra note 22, at 116. 
27. Federal Courts Study Committee Implementation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 302, 
104 Stat. 5104; see also Judith A. McKenna, Structural and Other Alternatives for the Federal 
Courts of Appeals: Report to the United States Congress and the Judicial Conference of the United 
States I (Federal Judicial Center 1993). The FJC is the federal courts' arm for research and 
continuing education. Its purpose is "to further the development and adoption of improved 
administration" in federal courts. 28 U.S.C. § 620(a) (1994). 
28. See McKenna, supra note 27, at 155. 
29. Committee on Long Range Planning of the Judicial Conference of the United States, 
Proposed Long Range Plan/or the Federal Courts (1995) [hereinafter Long Range Plan]. 
30. Id. at 42, 123-24. 
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national study commission.31 Congress has debated the possibility of 
restructuring the Ninth Circuit almost since the system's inception, and 
most recently considered division in the 104th and 105th Congresses. 
1. Earlier Proposals to Split the Ninth Circuit and the Circuit's 
Ameliorative Efforts 
Proposals to split the Ninth Circuit have been made since the 1930s.32 
The Hruska Commission's suggestion that Congress bifurcate the court 
was predictable; however, the recommendation that California be divided 
and that its four district courts be reassigned to different circuits was not 
foreseen. 33 This idea sparked controversy and delayed congressional 
examination of the court's bifurcation during the 1970s.34 A circuit-
splitting proposal that senators sponsored in 1983 evoked minimal 
legislative interest. 35 
The Ninth Circuit responded to certain criticisms of the court's 
performance by attempting to improve its administration. During 1978, 
Congress empowered appeals courts having more than fifteen active 
judges to reorganize with administrative units and to implement 
streamlined mechanisms for conducting en bane proceedings.36 The 
Ninth Circuit responded creatively to this congressional authorization by 
restructuring into three constituents for greater decentralization and more 
efficient administration.37 The court concomitantly adopted a local rule 
prescribing a limited en bane mechanism under which the chief judge 
31. For other sources that chronicle recent congressional activity, see generally supra note 1. 
32. See Baker, supra note 3, at 928; see also Office of the Circuit Executive, United States Courts 
for the Ninth Circuit, Position Paper in Opposition to S. 1686 Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
Reorganization Act (1991) [hereinafter S. 1686 Position Paper] (affording additional historical 
background). 
33. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
34. See supra note 20 and accompanying text 
35. See S. 1156, 98th Cong. (1983); Baker, supra note 3, at 928; Circuit Breaker-Move on to 
Split the Ninth, 10 A.B.A. J. 34, 34 (1984). 
36. "Any court of appeals having more than 15 active judges may constitute itself into 
administrative units •.• and may perform its en bane function by such number of members of its en 
bane court as may be prescribed by rule of the court of appeals." Act of Oct. 20, 1978, Pub. L. No. 
95-486, § 6, 92 Stat. 1629, 1633, supplemented by Act of Oct. 15, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-458, 94 
Stat 2035 (1981). 
37. See Baker, supra note 3, at 929. See generally Joseph Cecil, Administration of Justice in a 
Large Appellate Court: The Ninth Circuit Innovations Project 13-14 (1985); Office of the Circuit 
Executive, United States Courts for the Ninth Circuit, S. 948 Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
Reorganization Act 6-1 (1989) [hereinafter S. 948 Position Paper]. 
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and ten active judges who are randomly selected sit en bane to rehear 
cases on a majority vote of all active judges.38 These were not the only 
ameliorative efforts that the Ninth Circuit undertook. 
Ninth Circuit judges have increased their productivity, and the court 
has instituted numerous internal reforms. For example, the circuit employs 
prebriefing conferences to narrow issues for appeal, limit the size of briefs, 
and examine the possibility of settlement.39 The court's staff has enhanced 
its efficiency, and the circuit has implemented many technological 
advances.40 In 1989, the court published a report for Congress claiming that 
these measures had permitted it to decide the biggest caseload efficaciously, 
that there were no reasons to divide the circuit, and that the reforms used 
would enable the court to accommodate greater growth.41 Despite these 
assurances, Congress continued considering proposals to split the circuit 
during the 1980s and 1990s. 
2. Activities of the 104th Congress 
a. Circuit-Splitting Bills 
During May 1995, senators representing Pacific Northwest states 
offered proposed legislation that would have divided the Ninth Circuit.42 
This marked the fourth analogous effort to bifurcate the court in the 
38. 9th Cir. R 35-3 (formerly Rule 25). See generally ABA Report, supra note 21, at 542-43; 
Paul D. Carrington et al., Justice On Appeal 161-63, 200-03 (1976); Steven Bennett et al., "Mini" 
In Banc Proceedings: A Survey of Circuit Practices, 34 Clev. St. L. Rev. 531 (1986). 
39. See Baker, supra note 3, at 932; John B. Oakley, The Screening of Appeals: The Ninth 
Circuit's Experience in the Eighties and Innovations far the Nineties, 1991 BYU L. Rev. 859, 875-
80, 907-10; see also S. 948 Position Paper, supra note 37, at 6-7; Cecil, supra note 37, at 79-95. 
40. See Baker, supra note 3, at 932; Cathy Catterson, The Changing Ninth Circuit, 21 Ariz. St. 
L.J. 173, 176-78 (1989); Hellman, supra note 12, at 943-46; see also Office of the Circuit 
Executive, U.S. Courts for the Ninth Circuit, Position Paper in Opposition to S. 956-Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals Reorganization Act of 1995 (June 22, 1995), reprinted in 141 Cong. Rec. SI0,436 
(daily ed. July 10, 1995) (lauding court's experimentation) [hereinafterS. 956 Position Paper]. 
41. Judicial Council and United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Fourth Biennial 
Report to Congress on the Implementation of Section 6 of the Omnibus Judgeships Act of 1978 and 
Other Measures to Improve the Administration of Justice in the Ninth Circuit (1989). Senate Bill 
948, introduced by circuit-splitting proponents during 1989, was the "most credible effort" to divide 
the Ninth Circuit that advocates had staged prior to 1995. See Baker, supra note 3, at 932. However, 
they apparently failed to persuade Congress of bifurcation's propriety, while the bill's opponents 
seemed to counter convincingly the proponents' arguments. Hearing on S. 948 Before the Subcomm. 
On Courts and Admin. Practice of the Senate Comm. On the Judiciary, !Olst Cong. 361 (1990) 
[hereinafter S. 948 Hearing]. 
42. S. 956, 104th Cong. (1995); see also S. 853, 104th Cong. (1995) (providing earlier similar bill). 
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preceding thirteen years.43 One measure, Senate Bill 956, would have 
placed Alaska, Idaho, Montana, Oregon, and Washington in a new 
Twelfth Circuit and would have left Arizona, California, Hawaii, 
Nevada, Guam, and the Northern Mariana Islands in the Ninth Circuit.44 
The bill authorized nine active judges for the new Twelfth Circuit and 
nineteen active members for the proposed Ninth Circuit, but it did not 
create any new judgeships.45 
In September of that year, the Senate Judiciary Committee conducted 
a hearing on Senate Bill 956, and the Committee heard much helpful 
testimony and received additional instructive information from advocates 
and opponents of circuit-splitting.46 During a December markup, the 
Committee approved an amendment that would have placed California, 
Hawaii, Guam, and the Northern Mariana Islands in the Ninth Circuit 
with fifteen judges. The amendment would have included the other states 
of the current Ninth Circuit-Alaska, Arizona, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, 
Oregon, and Washington-in a new Twelfth Circuit with thirteen judges.47 
Advocates and opponents of the amendment disagreed over every 
justification articulated in support of circuit division. 
Supporters of circuit splitting relied primarily on four main arguments. 
First, proponents of bifurcation emphasized the difficulties that the 
circuit's substantial magnitude has allegedly caused. These complications 
included the court's enormous geographic expanse, its large number of 
judges (twenty-eight), the circuit's overwhelming docket, and the great 
cost of operating the court.48 Advocates of circuit splitting believed that 
the Ninth Circuit's reforms were insufficient to address these problems. 
Critics of circuit division responded in several ways to these 
contentions. The opponents asserted that the court had implemented 
measures addressing difficulties attributable to size. For instance, during 
the 1980s, the circuit created administrative units in Pasadena and Seattle 
for filing and orally arguing appeals, and that action reduced somewhat 
43. See Baker, supra note 3, at 928-45; Tobias, supra note 5, at 1363-75. 
44. S. 956. See generally Baker, supra note 3, at 928-45; Tobias, supra note 5, at 1363-75. 
45. s. 956. 
46. See Ninth Circuit Split: Hearings on S. 956 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th 
Cong. (1995) [hereinafter S. 956 Hearings]. 
47. See Senate Judiciary Comm. Markup ofS. 956 (Dec. 7, 1995); see also Senate Report, supra 
note3, at2. 
48. See, e.g., 141 Cong. Rec. S7504 (daily ed. May 25, 1995) (statement of Sen. Gorton); id. at 
S7505-06 (statement of Sen. Burns). 
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the distances that attorneys and parties must travel.49 Thus, critics claimed 
that creating a Twelfth Circuit would not decrease travel distances for 
many lawyers currently practicing in the area that would have been 
encompassed by the new court. Opponents also contended that the circuit's 
size provided advantages. For example, it afforded economies of scale 
while offering diversity in terms of case complexity and novelty and in 
terms of judges' political perspectives and geographic origins.50 
A second important argument of Senate Bill 956's champions was that 
Ninth Circuit case precedent lacked consistency. The statistical 
possibilities for conflicting decisions on a court with twenty-eight judges 
appear significant when 3278 different combinations of three-judge 
panels are possible.51 The Ninth Circuit Executive Office and experts 
who have evaluated the court have discovered too little inconsistency to 
require action as drastic as bifurcation.52 The circuit has concomitantly 
implemented procedures that limit inconsistency. For example, the 
court's staff attorneys thoroughly scrutinize all cases and they code into a 
computer the issues to be resolved.53 Using this system, the circuit 
assigns to a single three-judge panel those appeals that involve analogous 
issues and that are ready for resolution at the same time.54 
The third contention of split proponents was that the court's California 
judges, viewpoints, and cases dominated the Pacific Northwest. This idea 
partly implicated opposition to Ninth Circuit opinions in areas such as 
criminal and environmental law.55 These advocates suggested that a new 
Twelfth Circuit would better represent the regional views of the 
northwest states. Critics of the court's bifurcation, however, claimed that 
a better means of securing changes in the substantive law was to 
49. See supra note 36. 
50. See, e.g., S. 956 Position Paper, supra note 40; Steve Albert, Congress Weighs Plan to Divide 
Ninth Circuit, Legal Times, Feb. 1, 1993, at 12, 13 (quoting former Chief Judge James Browning's 
assertion that court's diversity is asset). 
51. See S. 956 Hearings, supra note 46 (statement of Sen. Gorton); Baker, supra note 3, at 938. 
52. See S. 956 Position Paper, supra note 40, at 4-5; Arthur D. Hellman, Jumboism and 
Jurisprudence: The Theory and Practice of Precedent in the Large Appellate Court, 56 U. Chi. L. 
Rev. 541 (1989). 
53. Hellman, supra note 12, at 945; see also U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit General 
Order4.I (1987). 
54. Hellman, supra note 12, at 945. 
55. See, e.g., 171 Cong. Rec. S7504, supra note 48 (statement of Sen. Gorton); 171 Cong. 
Rec. 87505-06, supra note 48 (statement of Sen. Burns). 
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persuade Congress to modify it.56 Opponents correspondingly questioned 
the advocates' underlying premise that judges who were stationed in 
California were monolithic and idiosyncratic.57 Analysis of the judges' 
perspectives and the computerized, random selection of three-judge panels 
rendered untenable attempts to stereotype these jurists, while a majority of 
the courts' activejudges were not even located in California 58 
Proponents and critics articulated several other ideas in favor of and 
against the Ninth Circuit's division. Opponents stated that the new Ninth 
Circuit would have had a significantly less advantageous ratio of three-
judge panels to cases than the proposed Twelfth Circuit and a much less 
beneficial ratio than the existing Ninth Circuit. Panels of the new Ninth 
Circuit would have annually addressed I 014 filings and panels of the 
proposed Twelfth Circuit would have annually treated 645 cases, while 
panels of the Ninth Circuit decided 868 appeals at the time.59 Critics also 
contended that the new Twelfth Circuit would have entailed considerable 
administrative cost and duplicated functions that the Ninth Circuit then 
discharged effectively.60 Opponents concomitantly asserted that many 
active judges of the court and numerous lawyers who practiced before it 
opposed division.61 
Advocates of bifurcation claimed that judges on a smaller circuit, such 
as the projected Twelfth Circuit that would have had nine judges, would 
be more collegial, thus increasing efficiency.62 This idea had some force, 
but familiarity might have fostered detrimental routinization and could 
56. See, e.g., S. 948 Hearing, supra note 41, at 284, 286 (statement of Sen. Pete Wilson); Daniel 
Trigoboff, Northwest Favors Splitting "California" Circuit, Legal Times, June 12, 1989, at 2 
(quoting former. Chief Judge Alfred Goodwin). 
57. Baker, supra note 3, at 941; Tobias, supra note 5, at 1373. 
58. Baker, supra note 3, at 941; Tobias, supra note 5, at 1373. 
59. See S. 956 Position Paper, supra note 40, at 6; see also Office of the Circuit Executive, 
United States Courts for the Ninth Circuit, Position Paper in Opposition to S. 956-Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals Reorganization Act of 1995 and Companion Bill H.R. 2935, at 3 (Feb. 3, 1996) 
(December markup realignment assigning 1065 appeals annually to proposed Ninth Circuit and 765 
appeals annually to proposed Twelfth Circuit) [hereinafter Second S. 956 Position Paper]. 
60. See S. 956 Position Paper, supra note 40, at 2-3. 
61. See Second S. 956 Position Paper, supra note 59, at 5; Senate Report, supra note 3, at 20-21; 
Tobias, supra note 5, at 1371. 
62. See S. 956 Position Paper, supra note 40; see also Senate Judiciary Markup of S. 956, supra 
note 47 (approving 13 judges for reconfigured proposed Twelfth Circuit and 15 judges for 
reconfigured proposed Ninth Circuit). 
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even have promoted disagreement.63 The court's magnitude might have 
forfeited advantages, namely diversity, that a larger court affords. 
The debate between split proponents and split critics eventually resulted 
in a compromise proposal to establish a national study commission. In 
March 1996, several proponents of Senate Bill 956 encouraged the Senate 
to pass the circuit division proposal as an amendment of a federal courts 
appropriations measure. Opponents vigorously challenged this effort on 
procedural grounds, although senators engaged in considerable substantive 
debate over splitting the circuit.64 Advocates and critics ultimately agreed 
to a study commission measure that garnered much bipartisan support, and 
the Senate approved a commission on March 21.65 When the House 
received the Senate proposal, it assigned the proposal to the Judiciary 
Subcommittee on Intellectual Property and Judicial Administration, which 
Representative Carlos Moorhead (R-Cal.) chaired. The House took no 
further action on the Senate measure during the 104th Congress, but 
Congress budgeted $500,000 for the commission's work even though it 
did not pass authorizing legislation. 66 
b. Commission Proposals 
The Senate study commission proposal was apparently an acceptable 
compromise, although the time prescribed for completing the commission's 
work would have been inadequate. The Senate measure mandated that 
the commission report to the President and the Congress no later than 
February 28, 1997 and that the Senate Judiciary Committee take action 
within sixty days of receiving the document.67 This proposal, allowing 
less than a year, differed from a prior study commission measure 
providing two years for the endeavor and calling for no Judiciary 
Committee action on the report, which Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-Cal.) 
had tendered as an amendment and which the Committee rejected on a 
63. See Carl Tobias, The D.C. Circuit as a National Court, 48 U. Miami L. Rev. 159, 169-70 
(1993). See generally Frank M. Coffin, On Appeal 213-29 (1994). 
64. 142 Cong. Rec. S2219-2303 (daily ed. Mar. 18, 1996). 
65. 142 Cong. Rec. S2544, S2545 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 1996). Rejection of division was advisable. 
It would have been a limited reform and could have precluded more effective solutions, such as 
creating a third tier of appellate courts or more judgeships. 
66. 142 Cong. Rec. Hl I, 164, HI 1,859 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1996). 
67. 142 Cong. Rec. S2545. 
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close vote in its December 7, 1995 markup.68 Moreover, the Federal 
Courts Study Committee, which undertook the most recent similar effort, 
required eighteen months to finish its work. 69 The Hruska Commission 
consumed an identical period to perform a study of the appeals courts. 70 
It would have been unwise to create an entity that lacked the requisite 
time to assemble the best information and to develop the finest 
recommendations. 
Somewhat analogous problems implicating scope may also have 
attended the proposed entity's charge, which stated that the commission 
was to: 
(1) study the present division of the United States into the several 
judicial circuits; 
(2) study the structure and alignment of the Federal Courts of 
Appeals, with particular reference to the Ninth Circuit; and 
(3) report to the President and the Congress its recommendations 
for such changes in circuit boundaries or structure as may be 
appropriate for the expeditious and effective disposition of the 
caseload of the Federal Courts of Appeal, consistent with 
fundamental concepts of fairness and due process. 71 
The mandate might have been too circumscribed because, for 
instance, the first two components did not expressly mention docket 
growth, which is the principal problem that the appeals courts now 
confront. 72 However, those commands could have been read to include 
mounting caseloads, and the third stricture explicitly prescribed 
recommendations "for the expeditious and effective disposition" of 
appeals.73 
Perhaps most restrictive was the requirement that suggestions pertain 
to "such changes in circuit boundaries or structure as may be appropriate" 
68. Senate Judiciary Comm. Markup of S. 956, supra note 47 (statement of Sen. Feinstein); see 
also Senate Report, supra note 3, at 19-20. 
69. See supra note 23. 
70. See supra note 14. 
71. 142 Cong. Rec. S2545 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 1996). Senator Feinstein's proposal was similar, but 
it did not include "with particular reference to the Ninth Circuit" See Senate Judiciary Comm. 
Markup ofS. 956, supra note 47 (statement of Sen. Feinstein). However, any national analysis of the 
appeals courts might well have emphasized this circuit 
72. See, e.g., Courts Study, supra note 22, at 109; Baker, supra note 21, at 33. 
73. 142 Cong. Rec. S2545. 
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for prompt and efficacious resolution. 74 Limiting the commission to 
structural options might have been overly narrow, because courts have 
numerous structural means of addressing the difficulties ascribed to 
rising dockets. Illustrative are increases in resources, such as judges and 
staff, and numerous procedures for expediting appellate disposition, 
which many courts have applied.75 Congress could have discouraged 
consideration of many potentially helpful alternatives by apparently 
confining the commission to non-structural alterations. 
When the Senate was debating the advisability of splitting the Ninth 
Circuit and approving S. 956, Governor Pete Wilson (R-Cal.) and Ninth 
Circuit Judge Diarmuid O'Scannlain developed different proposals for 
establishing a commission to analyze the court. Governor Wilson aired 
the prospect in a letter to Senator Orrin Hatch (R-Utah), Chair of the 
Senate Judiciary Committee, as the Committee prepared for the 
December 1995 Committee markup.76 Judge O'Scannlain examined the 
possibility of establishing a commission when testifying in the September 
1995 Judiciary Committee hearing.77 These proposals warrant little 
analysis here because their Ninth Circuit focus meant that they would have 
been incomplete by definition; Congress chose to authorize the recently 
completed national study, which the Wilson and O'Scannlain proposals 
only minimally inform.78 
3. Activities of the 105th Congress 
Members of the 105th Congress held varying viewpoints on problems 
facing the Ninth Circuit. Efforts in the House focused on the need for a 
national study of the appellate system, while the Senate proposed a more 
drastic solution, a circuit split. In the end, the 105th Congress adopted a 
modified version of the House proposal, but it left many aspects of the 
national study effort unclear. 
74. Id. 
75. See, e.g., Senate Report, supra note 3, at 27-28; Tobias, supra note 5, at 1363-64, 1405-07. 
76. Letter from Pete Wilson, Governor of California, to Senator Orrin Hatch, Chair, U.S. Senate 
Judiciary Comm. (Dec. 6, 1995) (on file with author). 
77. S. 956 Hearings, supra note 46, at 69 (statement of Ninth Circuit Judge O'Scannlain), 
reprinted in pertinent part in Diarmuid O'Scannlain, A Ninth Circuit Split ls Inevitable, But Not 
Imminent, 56 Ohio St. L.J. 947 (1995). 
78. Carl Tobias, Suggestions for Studying the Federal Appellate System, 49 Fla. L. Rev. 189, 
204-05 (1997). 
288 
Federal Appellate System 
The continuing debate over whether the Ninth Circuit should be split 
prompted senators and representatives to introduce several bills 
authorizing evaluations of the federal appeals courts during the first 
session of the 105th Congress. In January 1997, Senators Dianne 
Feinstein (D-Cal.) and Harry Reid (D-Nev.) offered a measure that 
would have created a national commission to assess the appellate 
courts.79 Senator Conrad Burns (R-Mont) and Representative Rick Hill 
(R-Mont.) then introduced the same study commission bill that differed 
in important respects from the one proffered by Senators Feinstein and 
Reid.80 During March, Representatives Howard Coble (R-N.C.) and 
Howard Berman (D-Cal.) proposed a measure that was similar to the 
Feinstein-Reid bill, which the House later changed somewhat.st That 
month, a number of senators from Pacific Northwest states introduced a 
bill that would have bifurcated the Ninth Circuit by moving Alaska, 
Arizona, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Oregon, and Washington to the 
projected Twelfth Circuit and leaving California, Hawaii, Guam, and the 
Northern Mariana Islands in the current Ninth Circuit.s2 
The Coble-Berman measure, H.R. 908, warrants emphasis because it 
most closely resembles the legislation that passed, while the other 
proposals have been analyzed elsewhere. s3 H.R. 908 was analogous in 
several significant ways to the study commission measures that the 104th 
Congress considered. The proposal instructed the entity to "study the 
structure and alignment of the Federal Court of Appeals system, with 
particular reference to the Ninth Circuit."84 The second phrase, therefore, 
changed the concept employed in the 104th Congress by adding the term 
"system," thus clarifying and stressing the systemic character of the 
evaluation prescribed.ss H.R. 908 also mandated that the commission 
"report ... its recommendations for such changes in circuit boundaries or 
structure as may be appropriate for the expeditious and effective 
79. S. 248, 105th Cong. (1997). The ideas in this paragraph and the remainder of Part I.B.3 are 
premised on conversations with individuals who are knowledgeable about the developments that 
occurred. 
80. S. 283, 105th Cong. (1997); H.R 639, 105th Cong. (1997). 
81. H.R. 908, 105th Cong. (1997). 
82. S. 431, 105th Cong. (1997). 
83. Tobias, supra note 78, at 205-14. 
84. H.R. 908, § l(b)(2). 
85. Compare S. 248, § l(b)(2), H.R 908, with S. 956, § l(b)(2), 104th Cong. 
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disposition of the caseload of the Federal Courts of Appeal, consistent 
with fundamental concepts of fairness and due process."86 
In early June, the House passed a revised version of the Coble-Berman 
measure that included a number of compromises. 87 This measure adopted 
the reporting provision discussed immediately above and accorded the 
commission eighteen months to complete the assessment. The bill was 
transmitted to the Senate and remained at the desk awaiting action in the 
upper chamber. 
The legislative history that accompanied H.R. 908 is significant 
because the House Committee Report on that bill provides the most 
comprehensive discussion of the national study commission that 
Congress approved. The bill received no hearings and little floor debate, 
while the floor statements of the bill's principal sponsors, Representatives 
Coble and Henry Hyde (R-Ill.), chair of the Judiciary Committee, were 
primarily based on the House Report. The House Committee Report 
concomitantly improves comprehension of the statutory terminology that 
authorizes the study, particularly the wording that is terse or vague. 
Moreover, the report was essentially the last, as well as the most thorough, 
precise, and authoritative pronouncement on the long, complex process 
behind the commission's approval. 
The House Committee Report offered informative perspectives on the 
commission and its duties, especially by elaborating and clarifying the 
responsibilities that Congress envisioned for it. The report observed that 
the measure originated in response to recurring efforts to split the biggest 
of the federal circuits, the Ninth, but warned that H.R. 908 "represents a 
sound approach to a problem of national concern: explosive growth in 
the caseload of all of the courts of appeals."88 The Judiciary Committee 
stated that the number of cases had risen by more than 200% and that 
Congress had increased the number of judgeships, although less rapidly, 
over the last two decades; yet, the appellate system's structure had 
effectively remained the same since 1891.89 The report proclaimed that 
the "time is ripe for a careful, objective study aimed at determining 
whether that structure can adequately serve the needs of the 21st 
86. H.R. 908, § l(b)(3). 
87. 143 Cong. Rec. H3225 (daily ed. June 3, 1997). 
88. House Report, supra note 10, at 1. 
89. Id. 
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century" and that the commission would be responsible for conducting 
the analysis.90 
The House Committee Report emphasized the prior efforts that led 
Congress to authorize the commission. The report repeated that the 
"immediate occasion for the Commission proposal was the debate over 
dividing the- Ninth Circuit, [however] the proposal has its origins in the 
work of the Federal Courts Study Committee, which Congress created in 
1988."91 This entity's 1990 report concluded that the federal appellate 
courts were already experiencing a "crisis of volume" and expressed the 
view that ''within as few as five years the nation could have to decide 
whether or not to abandon the present circuit structure in favor of an 
alternative structure that might better organize the more numerous 
appellate judges needed to grapple with a swollen caseload."92 The 
Federal Courts Study Committee evaluated, but did not endorse, five 
alternatives, urging further inquiry and discussion.93 
The Judiciary Committee said that the commission would "take up 
where the Federal Courts Study Committee left off [and] would be the 
first of its kind since the [Hruska Commission] which completed its work 
in 1975."94 The report considered it clear that: 
[D]ramatic changes have taken place in the work of the federal 
courts in those two decades, including the explosive growth noted 
above [but that] there have been no structural alterations except for 
the division of the old Fifth Circuit and the creation of the Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit.95 
In the June 3, 1997 floor debate on H.R. 908, the study commission's 
major champions proffered many observations analogous to those in the 
report and frequently quoted from it. Illustrative are the statements of 
Representative Coble, who chaired the Judiciary subcommittee that had 
primary responsibility for the measure: 
H.R. 908 was introduced in response to recurring attempts to divide 
the largest of the Federal judicial circuits, the ninth. However, if 
properly implemented, the commission proposal represents a sound 
approach to a problem of national concern, and that is the explosive 
90. Id. at 1-2. 
91. Id. at 2; see also supra notes 22-26 and accompanying text 
92. Courts Study, supra note 22, at 109; see also House Report, supra note 10, at 2. 
93. Courts Study, supra note 22, at 116-23; see also supra note 25. 
94. House Report, supra note 10, at 2; see also supra notes 14-20, 22-26 and accompanying text 
95. House Report, supra note 10, at 2; see also supra notes 7, 17-19 and accompanying text 
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growth in the caseload of all of the courts of appeals. The time is 
right, it seems to me, for a careful, objective study aimed at 
determining whether that structure can adequately serve the needs 
of the 21st century. The task of the commission would be to carry 
out that study.96 
Representative Hyde, the House Judiciary Committee chair, reiterated 
many sentiments expressed in the House Committee Report and 
numerous concepts that Representative Coble voiced. For instance, the 
chair repeated that the "goal of the commission will be to study the entire 
Federal appellate court system, but, of course, with a particular view 
toward addressing the problems facing the largest and most diverse 
circuit we have, the ninth." 97 
The Judiciary Committee chair repeated and elaborated the notions 
relating to the commission's origins and purposes that were expressed in 
the report and in Representative Coble's floor statement. Representative 
Hyde correspondingly confirmed that the commission would "take up 
where the Federal Courts Study Committee left off'' and detailed this 
entity's most significant determinations, including the finding that the 
appellate courts were encountering a "crisis of volume."98 
While H.R. 908 awaited Senate action, members of the Senate decided 
to promote more extensive reforms. In mid-July, Senators Ted Stevens 
CR-Alaska), Slade Gorton (R-Wash.), and Conrad Burns (R-Mont.), who 
all served on the Appropriations Committee, convinced their colleagues 
to adopt an appropriations rider that would have split the Ninth Circuit, 
and on July 29, the entire Senate approved this rider. The measure would 
have left California and Nevada in that court.99 The rider would have 
established a new Twelfth Circuit that included Alaska, Arizona, Hawaii, 
Idaho, Montana, Oregon, Washington, Guam, and the Northern Mariana 
Islands. 100 The measure prescribed fifteen judges for the Ninth Circuit 
and thirteen judges for the Twelfth Circuit and provided the Twelfth 
96. 143 Cong. Rec. H3223 (daily ed. June 3, 1997). He next remarked on the Hruska Commission 
and recent "dramatic changes" in the appeals courts' work in terms that were quite similar. See supra 
notes 94-95 and accompanying text. 
97. 143 Cong. Rec. H3224. 
98. Id. He stated that the study was timely, using data which showed that "in fiscal 1996, the 
number of appeals filed in the 12 regional courts of appeals rose four percent to 51,991 [which was] 
an all-time high in filings, with eight circuits reporting increases." Id. 
99. I rely in the remainder of this and the next three paragraphs on S. 1022, 105th Cong.§ 305 
(1997) and 143 Cong. Rec. S8041 (daily ed. July 24, 1997). 
100. 143 Cong. Rec. S8044. 
292 
Federal Appellate System 
Circuit two co-equal headquarters and two co-equal court clerks in 
Phoenix and Seattle. 
Republican senators, primarily from the West, expressed numerous 
ideas that had previously been voiced during the floor debate in favor of 
Senate action that would divide the Ninth Circuit For instance, Senate 
membefs reiterated the idea that the Ninth Circuit's magnitude in terms 
of population, geography, dockets, and judges fosters difficulties, such as 
travel costs and inconsistent case law.101 Several senators claimed that 
the Supreme Court reversal rate demonstrates that the Ninth Circuit 
requires division.102 They asserted that projections for population 
increases in the West will multiply these complications.103 
Senate critics of the court's bifurcation contended that there was too 
much uncertainty about the exact character of the complications 
confronting the Ninth Circuit and the other appeals courts, and the best 
remedies for those problems, to institute drastic measures like bifurcating 
the Ninth Circuit.104 For example, division advocates have claimed that 
the Ninth Circuit's size precludes prompt appellate disposition;105 
however, minimal data correlate magnitude with time to resolution. 
Moreover, opponents argued that the split would have improperly 
distributed the court's docket. For instance, judges of the proposed 
Twelfth Circuit would have had to decide 239 appeals annually, while 
judges of the new Ninth Circuit would have had to resolve 363 cases 
annually, which would have been fifty percent more. 106 Despite the 
critics' contentions, the Senate rejected 55-45 along political party lines 
an amendment that would have approved a study analogous to that which 
the House had authorized.107 Thus, the Senate approved a split as the 
solution to the Ninth Circuit's problems. 
101. See, e.g., 143 Cong. Rec. S8044 (statement of Sen. Gorton); 143 Cong. Rec. S8046-47 
(statement of Sen. Hatch). 
102. See, e.g., 143 Cong. Rec. S8047 (statement of Sen. Hatch); 143 Cong. Rec. S8047-48 
(statement of Sen. Burns). 
103. See, e.g., 143 Cong. Rec. S8044 (statement of Sen. Gorton); 143 Cong. Rec. S8048 
(statement of Sen. Bums). 
104. See, e.g., 143 Cong. Rec. S8041-44 (statement of Sen. Feinstein); 143 Cong. Rec. S8045 
(statement of Sen. Leahy). 
105. See, e.g., 143 Cong. Rec. S8050-51 (statement of Sen. Craig); 143 Cong. Rec. S8052-53 
(statement of Sen. Kempthome). 
106. See, e.g., 143 Cong. Rec. S8042 (statement of Sen. Feinstein); 143 Cong. Rec. S8060 
(reprinting Jetter from Procter Hug, Jr., Chief Judge, U.S. Courts for the Ninth Circuit, to Senator 
Feinstein). 
107. See 143 Cong. Rec. S8087. 
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The appropriations rider prompted sharp criticism from Representatives 
Hyde and Coble, and the California delegation. 108 These lawmakers 
articulated a number of arguments against circuit splitting. For example, 
the opponents argued that the division contemplated would inappropriately 
allocate the caseload between the two new courts and that action as 
drastic as bifurcation required clearer understanding of the precise 
problems affecting the court and the appellate system, the impacts of 
those difficulties, and the most efficacious ways of treating them. 
In mid-November, the House-Senate Conference Committee on 
Commerce-Justice-State Appropriations refused to adopt the appropriations 
rider that would have split the Ninth Circuit.109 The committee replaced the 
measure with a national study that included many features of the 
measures both Houses had considered and effectively incorporated most 
aspects of H.R. 908.110 The compromise prescribed five commissioners, 
all of whom the Chief Justice of the United States was to name within 
thirty days; afforded the commission ten months to study and two months 
to write a report and recommendations; and incorporated verbatim 
H.R. 908's mandate. On December 19, Chief Justice Rehnquist appointed 
retired Supreme Court Justice Byron White, U.S. Court of Appeals 
Judges Gilbert Merritt of the Sixth Circuit, and Pamela Rymer of the Ninth 
Circuit, U.S. District Judge William Browning of Arizona, and N. Lee 
Cooper, the immediate past president of the American Bar Association. 111 
In sum, the November 1997 measure that authorized a national 
commission to analyze the federal appeals courts left unclear certain 
significant dimensions of the assessment and provided ilie entity 
comparatively little time to conclude its work. The second section of this 
essay, therefore, examines the efforts that the commissioners instituted in 
discharging the important responsibilities that Congress assigned them. 
108. See, e.g., Letter from Henry J. Hyde, Chair, House Judiciary Comm., to Robert Livingston, 
Chair, House Comm. on Appropriations (Sept. 5, 1997) (on file with author); Letter from Jerry 
Lewis et al., Members of Congress from California, to Harold Rogers, Chair, Appropriations 
Subcomm. on Commerce, Justice, State and the Judiciary (Oct. 17, 1997) (on file with author). I also 
rely in this paragraph on conversations with individuals who are knowledgeable about the 
development that occurred. 
109. Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 305, 111 Stat. 2491, 2491-92 (1997); Bill Kisliuk, White, Rymer to 
Consider Circuit Split, Recorder, Dec. 22, 1997, at l. 
110. See Ill Stat. at 2491-92; Kisliuk, supra note 109, at l. 
111. Commission Report, supra note l, at !; see also 111 Stat. at 2491-92; Kisliuk, supra note 
109, at !. 
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II. THE COMMISSION'S EFFORTS 
Because numerous aspects of the work the Commission on Structural 
Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals undertook were not open 
to the public, it is difficult to detail accurately all of the activities that the 
Commission undertook in the course of the rather brief period that it had 
to study and report on the federal appellate courts.112 For instance, 
meetings among the commissioners were generally private and commu-
nications between them and the staff were not public. In fairness, the 
important, controversial, and delicate nature of the commission's work 
and the desirability of fostering candid exchange may have necessitated 
secrecy, while the commissioners instituted numerous efforts, such as the 
establishment of a website, in an attempt to keep the public well 
informed. 113 Notwithstanding these difficulties, it is possible to identify 
many important initiatives of the entity partly by relying upon the 
information included in the commission report. 
Early in 1998, the commission instituted several efforts to organize its 
work, as well as to collect, analyze and synthesize relevant information 
on the federal appellate courts. At the commission's first formal meeting 
during January 1998, it appointed Professor Daniel Meador, James 
Monroe Professor of Law Emeritus at the University of Virginia, as the 
Executive Director.114 One of the entity's initial actions was to enlist the 
assistance of the Federal Judicial Center (FJC) and the Administrative 
Office of the United States Courts (AO), the principal research arms of 
the federal courts.115 In the first phases of the commission's endeavors, it 
requested that the FJC compile comprehensive lists of the problems that 
the appellate courts were purportedly encountering and of potential 
solutions for these difficulties. 116 The FJC thoroughly surveyed much of 
the prior research on the regional circuits and compiled extensive 
112. I rely in this section on the Commission's Report, see supra note 1, and on conversations 
with numerous individuals who are familiar with the commission's work. 
113. Commission on Stroclllral Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals (visited Apr. 4, 
1999) <http://app.comm.uscourts.gov>. 
114. Commission Report, supra note 1, at 2; see also§ 305(a)(4)(A), 111 Stat at 2492. 
115. Commission Report, supra note 1, at 2. Congress had authorized the commission to invoke 
the aid of these two entities, and the commissioners worked closely with the FJC and the AO during 
much of the project.§ 305(a)(4)(D), 111 Stat at 2492. 
116. Commission Report, supra note 1, at 2. 
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enumerations of the complications the courts apparently experienced and 
possible remedies for them. 117 
From the earliest stages, the commission also attempted to solicit 
much public input on numerous issues that were relevant to its 
mandate.118 The commissioners held public hearings during March in 
Atlanta and Dallas, partially because those cities are located in the two 
appeals courts created from the former Fifth Circuit. The commission 
conducted public hearings during April in Chicago and New York, two 
of the nation's largest metropolitan areas and the location of the 
headquarters for the Seventh and Second Circuits. The commissioners 
held public hearings during May in Seattle and San Francisco, partly to 
seek the views of those in the West on whether the Ninth Circuit was 
encountering difficulties that were sufficiently problematic to warrant 
treatment, particularly with measures as dramatic as circuit division. The 
commission requested that witnesses address the problems it perceived 
"in the federal appellate system's structure, organization, alignment, 
processes, and personnel" which might interfere with "its ability to render 
decisions that "are reasonably timely, are consistent among the litigants 
appearing before it, are nationally uniform in their interpretations of 
federal law, and are reached through processes that afford appeals 
adequate, deliberative attention of judges."119 The commissioners also 
sought potential remedies for the perceived complications and their 
benefits and disadvantages while asking which aspects of the courts were 
working well. Individuals and entities that did not, or could not, testify at 
the hearings were invited to tender written submissions for commission 
consideration. 
Many witnesses who testified at the hearings were federal appellate 
court judges. 120 The witnesses provided considerable helpful information 
about the problems that increasing dockets and limited resources have 
been presenting for the regional circuits and a plethora of possible 
solutions for these complications. The commission heard a broad 
spectrum of viewpoints related to the difficulties and the potential 
remedies. 
117. Id. at 3. 
118. Id. 
119. See News Release, Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals, 
Appellate Commission Schedules Public Hearings (Feb. 26, 1998), available in <http://app.comm. 
uscourts.gov./News-index.htm>. 
120. The assertions in this and the next paragraph are premised on review of the hearing 
transcripts. 
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Perhaps most interesting about the testimony was the striking lack of 
entirely new ideas. Practically all of the witnesses proffered testimony 
that essentially repeated concepts that they or others had expressed 
elsewhere. For example, Eleventh Circuit Chief Judge Joseph Hatchett 
and Gerald Bard Tjoflat, the court's former Chief Judge, continued their 
debate o-ver whether the appeals court needs adilitional active judgeships 
to resolve its large, mounting caseload. 121 Chief Judge Hatchett testified 
that the court "should expand in a limited fashion from twelve to fifteen 
judges," while Judge Tjoflat opposed more judgeships.122 However, each 
judge had earlier made similar public pronouncements.123 Relatively few 
witnesses stated that the circuits confront difficulties that are troubling 
enough to deserve remediation, especially with approaches as drastic as 
splitting appeals courts. 
To assist in the inquiry, the Federal Judicial Center helped the 
commission draft several survey instruments for soliciting applicable 
material.124 The commissioners then circulated questionnaires to 
appellate and district judges as well as attorneys who had filed appeals to 
solicit information about their experiences. The commission also sought 
the views of the Supreme Court Justices.125 Justice Anthony Kennedy, 
who is a former member of the Ninth Circuit, Justice Sandra Day 
O'Connor, who is the Justice with responsibility for the circuit, Justice 
John Paul Stevens, Justice Antonin Scalia, and Justice Stephen Breyer 
submitted responses. 126 The first four Justices claimed that the court was 
121. See Testimony Before the Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of 
Appeals, of Joseph Hatchett, Chief Judge, U.S. Courts for the Eleventh Circuit, and Gerald Bard 
Tjolat, Circuit Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit (Mar. 23, 1998) (on file with 
author). 
122. Id. 
123. See Considering the Appropriate Allocation of Judgeships in the U.S. Courts of Appeals for 
the Fourth, Fifth and Eleventh Circuits: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Oversight and 
the Courts of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary (Feb. 7, 1997 & June 9, 1997) (testimony of Chief 
Judge Hatchett (on file with author); Gerald Bard Tjoflat, More Judges, Less Justice, A.B.A. J., July 
1993, at 70, 70. 
124. Commission Report, supra note 1, at 4. 
125. Id. at 3. 
126. Letter from Stephen G. Breyer, Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Byron R. White, Chair, 
Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals (Sept 11, 1998) (on file 
with author); Letter from Anthony Kennedy, Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Byron R. White, Chair, 
Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals (Aug. 17, 1998) (on file 
with author); Letter from Sandra Day O'Connor, Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Byron R. White, 
Chair, Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals (June 23, 1998) (on 
file with author); Letter from Antonin Scalia, Justice, U.S. Supreme Court to Byron R. White, Chair, 
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too large and suggested that it be divided. They also proposed that three 
regional circuits be created out of the existing Ninth Circuit. One court 
would include the five states of the Pacific Northwest. A second would 
encompass the Eastern and Northern Districts of California and Hawaii. 
The third would include the Central and Southern Districts of California, 
Arizona, Nevada, and the territories. Chief Justice Rehnquist, in 
commenting on the commission's Tentative Draft Report, described the 
divisional idea as "better than merely a compromise between those who 
have advocated a split of the circuit and those who argue for the status 
quo [which appeared] to address head-on most of the significant 
concerns raised about the court" with minimal administrative disruption. 
127 Justice Breyer acknowledged that congestion was the major difficulty 
confronting the appellate courts, but he rejected circuit-splitting at this 
juncture and urged the commission to consult the ideas included in the 
Long Range Plan compiled by the Judicial Conference. 128 
The commission then analyzed and synthesized all of the information 
that it had solicited and received. For example, it compiled the results of 
the surveys that were circulated to judges and attorneys and reviewed the 
hearing testimony and written submissions tendered to the commission. 
Based on this input, the commissioners wrote a tentative draft report and 
recommendations which they issued for public comment on October 7, 
1998.129 The commission afforded interested members of the public thirty 
days to submit their views on the draft report and suggestions. The 
commissioners reviewed the public input received, modified certain features 
of the draft report and proposals in light of the public comment and finalized 
their report and suggestions for Congress and the President in December. 
Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals (Aug. 21, 1998) (on file 
with author); Letter from John Paul Stevens, Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Byron R. White, Chair, 
Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals (Aug. 24, 1998) (on file 
with author). 
127. Commission Report, supra note 1, at 39. & n.91 (quoting Letter from Chief Justice 
Rehnquist to Byron White). 
128. Letter from Stephen G. Breyer, supra note 126; see also Long Range Plan, supra note 29. 
129. Commission Report, supra note 1, at 4. 
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III. ANALYSIS OF THE REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. Descriptive Analysis 
The commission compiled a comprehensive report that showed that it 
had studied the "present division of the United States into the several 
judicial circuits [and] the structure and alignment of the Federal Court 
of Appeals system" as well as approaches for facilitating the fair, 
"expeditious and effective disposition" of caseloads.130 The commission 
report considered the problems that the Ninth Circuit and the appellate 
system have encountered and may face in the future and explored 
potential solutions for these difficulties. 
The most pressing complications that the commission identified were 
mounting dockets and insufficient resources to address those appeals. 131 
The report also suggested that the difficulties could prevent courts from 
resolving cases as promptly, efficaciously, and equitably as was desirable. 
The commission detected several other potential problems, principally in 
its evaluation of the Ninth Circuit, which it characterized as less 
significant. For example, the report evinced concerns about the ability of 
the Ninth Circuit to function in an effective and timely manner, to produce 
a coherent body of circuit law, and to perform its en bane functions 
effectively.132 The report also expressed concerns about how the size of 
the court's geographic jurisdiction affected federalism, regionalism, and 
efficacious court operations. 133 
The commission reviewed numerous possible solutions for the 
complications discovered. The report examined several structural 
remedies, including divisional organization of the circuits and the 
prospects of two-judge panels and district court appellate panels 
(DCAP). 134 The commission correspondingly considered certain non-
structural approaches, principally under the rubric of appellate jurisdiction, 
which involved the resolution of bankruptcy appeals, general discretionary 
review, and the Federal Circuit.135 
130. See supra note 84 and accompanying text 
131. Commission Report, supra note 1, at ix, xi, 13-25. 
132. Id. 
133. Id. 
134. Id. at 59-66. 
135. Id. at 67-76. 
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The report specifically comprised six sections. The first described the 
commission's creation, mission, and activities. 136 The second section 
discussed the past and present circumstances of the federal appellate 
system, emphasizing the transformation of the courts of appeals and their 
work since the mid-1960s and the emergence of the circuit as an entity of 
federal judicial administration.137 Most of the commission's analysis 
appears in the third through sixth sections of the report. 
The third part, which constituted one-third of the report, considered 
the Ninth Circuit and its court of appeals. 138 The section first described 
the circuit and the court of appeals, summarized the arguments 
propounded in the debate over splitting them and posited several criteria 
that inform this debate. 139 The commissioners found Ninth Circuit 
administration "at the least, on a par with that of other circuits, and 
innovative in many respects" and added that there was "no good reason 
to split the circuit solely out of concern for its size or administration [or] 
to solve problems [of] ... consistency, predictability and coherence of 
circuit law."140 The commission stated that dividing the court would 
eliminate the administrative benefits that the current configuration offers 
and would deprive the Pacific seaboard and the West of a means to 
maintain consistent federal law in this region. 141 The commissioners 
rejected circuit-splitting, unless there were no other way of treating 
perceived difficulties in the court of appeals, and proffered adjudicative 
divisions as an efficacious alternative for the Ninth Circuit, which should 
be available to all of the appellate courts as they increase in size.142 The 
commission specifically suggested that the Ninth Circuit remain intact 
but that it operate with three regionally based adjudicative divisions. The 
commission proposed that each division with a majority of its judges 
resident in its region have exclusive jurisdiction over appeals arising 
from district courts in those areas. 143 The plan included a Circuit Division 
to resolve conflicts that develop between regional divisions. 144 The 
136. Id. at 1-6. 
137. Id. at 7-28. 
138. Id. at 29-57. 
139. Id. at 29-40. 
140. Id. at ix. 
141. Id. at ix-x. 
142. Id. at x. 
143. Id. at 43. 
144. Id. at 43-46. 
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commissioners asserted that their "plan would increase the consistency 
and coherence of the law, maximize the likelihood of genuine collegiality, 
establish an effective procedure for maintaining uniform decisional law 
within the circuit, and relate the appellate forum more closely to the region 
it serves."14s 
Realizing that Congress might reject the recommendation for 
adjudicative divisions and restructure the Ninth Circuit, the commission 
stated that the "challenges to finding a workable solution are 
daunting."146 The commissioners evaluated more than a dozen possible 
alternatives and "found no merit in any of them."147 Nonetheless, the 
commission described three plans that it considered arguable.148 The first 
plan would leave Arizona, California, and Nevada in the Ninth Circuit 
and place the remaining states and territories in the new Twelfth 
Circuit.149 The second plan would leave California, Nevada, Hawaii, and 
the territories in the Ninth Circuit, move Arizona to the Tenth Circuit, 
and place the Pacific Northwest states in a new Twelfth Circuit.1so The 
third plan would leave Arizona, the Central and Southern Districts of 
California, Hawaii, Nevada, and the territories in the Ninth Circuit, and 
place the Pacific Northwest states and the Eastern and Northern Districts 
of California in a new Twelfth Circuit.1s1 In the end, however, the 
commission characterized each of these possibilities as flawed and 
endorsed none. 
The fourth section of the report examined structural options for all the 
courts of appeals and urged Congress to accord the courts greater 
flexibility. 1s2 The commissioners first remarked that they had developed 
the idea of divisional organization both for the immediate Ninth Circuit 
situation and as an alternative to circuit-splitting for the remaining 
appeals courts as they grow.1s3 The commission, therefore, suggested 
legislation that would afford individual courts considerable flexibility in 
designing a divisional plan, emphasizing that the Ninth Circuit proposal 
145. Id. at x; see also id. at 42-45. 
146. Id. at 53. 
147. Id. 
148. Id. at 54-57. 
149. Id. at 54. 
150. Id. at 55-56. 
151. Id. 
152. Id. at 59-66. 
153. Id. at 59. 
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was only one model. 154 Recognizing that these courts vary in tenns of 
their size, dockets, judicial resources, and growth rates, the commission 
urged that Congress "equip those courts to cope with future, unforeseen 
conditions by according them a flexibility they do not now have."155 The 
commissioners specifically recommended that Congress authorize each 
court to decide with panels of two, rather than three, judges appeals that 
do not involve questions of public importance, pose special difficulty, or 
have precedential value. 156 The commission also suggested that Congress 
authorize circuits to create district court appellate panels consisting of 
two district judges and one circuit judge to review designated categories 
of cases, with discretionary review available in the court of appeals. 157 
The commissioners contended that these measures collectively "should 
equip the courts of appeals with an ability, structurally and procedurally, 
to accommodate continued caseload growth into the indefinite future, 
while maintaining the quality of the appellate process and delivering 
consistent decisions-assuming, of course, that the system has the 
necessary number of judges and other resources."158 
The fifth section evaluated the structural ramifications of several 
specific features of appellate jurisdiction, although a majority of the 
commission considered overall federal jurisdiction beyond the scope of 
its mandate. 159 The commissioners suggested that Congress "not 
authorize direct court of appeals review of bankruptcy decisions, pending 
further study by the Judicial Conference."160 The commission believed 
that legislative approval of direct review would exacerbate problems in the 
appeals courts and "destroy the arguably successful innovation of 
bankruptcy appellate panels" (BAP).161 In the final analysis, the commission 
concluded that Congress needed more infonnation to make the best 
decision and urged "Congress to refrain from changing the bankruptcy 
appellate system until the Judicial Conference has an adequate opportunity 
to study it and propose any necessary improvements."162 
154. Id. at 60. 
155. Id. at xi. 
156. Id. at 62-64. 
157. Id. at xi. 
158. Id.; see also id. at 57-65. 
159. Id. at xi; see also infra notes 170-73 and accompanying text. 
160. Commission Report, supra note 1, at xi. 
161. Id. at 67; see also infra note 178 and accompanying text. 
162. Commission Report, supra note 1, at 70. 
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The cormruss10n also analyzed the proposal that appellate court 
jurisdiction be made discretionary for all appeals but proffered no 
particular recommendation because it was not convinced that the change 
was a good idea. 163 The commissioners, without providing any specific 
suggestions, further evaluated the place of the Federal Circuit in the 
appellate system and explored tax and social security appeals as illustrative 
of certain categories of cases that have frequently been suggested as 
candidates for the court's jurisdiction. 164 
The sixth section included a recapitulation and concluding observations. 
The commissioners asserted that their suggestions were "constructive, 
forward-looking innovations [that] do not work radical change ... [but 
rather] build on the existing circuit structure and alignment [and] ... are 
evolutionary, not revolutionary."165 They contended that the recom-
mendation for divisional organization of the Ninth Circuit, if successful, 
would preserve this court and the entire structure of the appellate system 
for the foreseeable future. 166 The commission, thus, urged that Congress 
authorize two-judge panels, DCAPs, and divisions, which would permit 
the Ninth Circuit to continue operating as a "laboratory for innovation."167 
The commission also urged Congress to consider ideas regarding 
bankruptcy appeals, discretionary appellate jurisdiction, and other possible 
uses of the Federal Circuit. 168 
The report included additional views. Judge Merritt, whom retired 
Justice White joined, offered a different perspective on the issue of 
federal jurisdiction.169 They asserted that docket growth is the foremost 
difficulty that the appeals courts face and that caseload increases and 
jurisdiction directly implicate circuit structure. 170 Judge Merritt, therefore, 
claimed that the majority's narrow interpretation of the commission 
mandate to preclude jurisdiction would deprive Congress and the 
President of suggestions that could treat the symptoms of, and even cure, 
the docket problem. 171 Accordingly, the dissent urged Congress to reform 
163. Id. at 70-72. 
164. Id. at 72-74. 
165. Id. at 75. 
166. Id. at 76. 
167. Id. 
168. Id. at 75-76. 
169. Id. at 77-84. 
170. Id. 
171. Id. 
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diversity jurisdiction by prescribing a system that would permit the 
removal to federal court only those cases that involve local prejudice or 
complex multistate subject matter. 172 
In short, the commission compiled a thorough report that determined 
that numerous circuits now experience, or could encounter, docket 
expansion that might limit prompt, effective, or fair appellate disposition. 
The commissioners also comprehensively surveyed potential responses 
to mounting appeals. Nonetheless, the commission proffered few 
proposals to alter circuit structure, apparently because it found the 
complications insufficiently troubling to warrant structural remedies or 
because it viewed structural changes as less effective than other 
solutions. 
B. Critical Analysis 
This subsection critically assesses the commission's most notable 
recommendations for improvement. Because the statutory charge and the 
commissioners emphasized that the Ninth Circuit and adjudicative 
divisions were central to the commission's suggestions, I concentrate on 
these issues. This subsection then analyzes the commissioners' proposal 
that Congress authorize appeals courts to resolve some categories of 
cases with two appellate judges or with panels comprised of one circuit 
and two district judges. I next briefly evaluate the commission's 
treatment of certain structural consequences entailed in authorizing direct 
appellate review of bankruptcy decisions and tax and social security 
cases as those ideas have been examined elsewhere and the commissioners 
only posited recommendations regarding bankruptcy appeals. 
1. The Ninth Circuit and Adjudicative Divisions 
The commission's core proposal was the call for Congress to establish 
three adjudicative divisions of the existing Ninth Circuit, which would 
remain intact for administrative purposes. 173 The divisions would be 
premised on geography, while a majority of the appellate court judges 
stationed in specific locales would have responsibility for reviewing 
172. Id. 
173. Id. at 41-45; see also supra text accompanying notes 144-46. 
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appeals that arise from districts within their jurisdiction and a Circuit 
Division would resolve conflicts.174 
The divisional concept would afford some general benefit. The system 
would permit the circuit, which has been very successful and whose 
administration the commission described as "innovative" in many 
ways, 175 to continue operating with minimal disruption. For example, 
divisions would respect the character of the West as a distinct region by 
having one court construe and apply federal law there. 176 The divisional 
arrangement would fragment federal practice in the western states less 
than circuit-splitting because this scheme would preserve a single circuit 
judicial conference and one set of local appellate rules.177 Moreover, 
divisions would enable the Ninth Circuit, which has demonstrated that 
bigger appeals courts can efficiently resolve substantial dockets and 
realize certain economies, to continue serving as a model for larger 
circuits.178 Illustrative are the court's creative testing and refinement of 
measures that foster prompt, efficacious, and fair disposition.179 These 
include procedures for tracking issues and cases, alternative dispute 
resolution programs, and bankruptcy appellate panels, which Congress 
apparently found so successful that it required the remaining appeals 
courts to consider instituting them.180 The circuit has also been able to 
coordinate effectively its active judges by, for example, assigning them 
to districts that experience overwhelming caseloads, judicial shortages, 
or other difficulties.181 
Divisions could offer specific advantages as well.182 First, they would 
reduce travel expenses for circuit members, attorneys, and litigants.183 
Second, the divisional structure might promote collegiality, an elusive 
concept that Tenth Circuit Judge Deanell Tacha has defined as "lively, 
tolerant, thoughtful debate; it is the open and frank exchange of opinions; 
174. Commission Report, supra note 1, at41-45; see also supra text accompanying notes 144-46. 
175. Commission Report, supra note 1, at ix; see also supra text accompanying note 141. 
176. Commission Report, supra note 1, at 45; see also supra text accompanying note 142. 
177. Commission Report, supra note 1, at 46. 
178. Id. at 32-37; S. 956 Position Paper, supra note 40; supra notes 141-43 and accompanying text 
179. Id. at 32-37; S. 956 Position Paper, supra note40; supra notes 141-43 and accompanying text 
180. Bankruptcy Refonn Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 104, 108 Stat 4106, 4109-10; see 
also Long Range Plan, supra note 29, at 47. 
181. Commission Report, supra note 1, at 32-37; S. 956 Position Paper, supra note 40; supra 
notes 141-43 and accompanying text 
182. Commission Report, supra note 1, at 29-30, 47-50. 
183. Id. 
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it is comfortable controversy; it is mutual respect earned through 
vigorous exchange."184 Appellate judges in the three divisions would sit 
together on panels more frequently and, thus, secure increased familiarity 
with their colleagues' views on substantive and procedural questions, 
interpretive techniques, political issues, and decisional styles. 185 This 
could reinforce the importance of listening and keeping an open mind 
while enhancing the judges' ability to hold themselves and each other 
accountable and be accountable as a court. 186 These judges and the fewer 
district judges whose determinations they would review would know one 
another better professionally and personally. 187 Appellate court judges 
who are appointed from, and have responsibility for, a smaller 
geographic expanse would correspondingly possess or acquire greater 
appreciation for the local legal and broader cultures from which appeals 
emanate. 188 The Circuit Division should also help preserve consistent 
precedent. The commission cogently summarized these ideas when it 
claimed that the divisional plan would enhance consistent and coherent 
circuit law, maximize the possibility of genuine collegiality, create an 
efficacious procedure for maintaining consistent decisional law in the 
circuit, and relate the appellate forum more directly to the area it 
serves. 189 Finally, if divisions prove efficacious in the Ninth Circuit, the 
concept should be readily transferable to other courts as they grow, 
thereby vitiating the need to consider circuit-splitting elsewhere. 190 
The divisional proposal might impose some disadvantages, or be 
relatively ineffective, however. Divisions may not necessarily promote 
collegiality and could even lead to disagreement, detrimental routinization, 
or bureaucratic rigidity.191 It remains unclear whether greater familiarity 
with the district judges whose dispositions are being appealed or the 
locales from which cases arise will lead to faster, more effective, or fairer 
appellate decisionmaking. Instead, the divisional arrangement might 
184. Deanell Reece Tacha, The "C" Word: On Collegiality, 56 Ohio St. L.J. 585, 587 (1995); see 
also Long Range Plan, supra note 29, at 44-45; William M. Richman & William L. Reynolds, 
Elitism, Expediency and the New Certiorari: Requiem for the Learned Hand Tradition, 81 Cornell L. 
Rev. 273, 323-25 (1996). 
185. Commission Report, supra note l, at 29-30, 47-50. 
186. Id. at 29-30; Tacha, supra note 185, at 587-91. 
187. Commission Report, supra note l, at 47-48. 
188. Id. 
189. Id. at x. 
190. Id. at 29-30, 47-50. 
191. See supra note 63 and accompanying text. 
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erode the circuits' discharge of their important federalizing :function-
that is, the responsibility for reconciling the U.S. Constitution and 
national policies with state and local concerns.192 Moreover, divisions 
will not limit the quantity of Ninth Circuit law that the court's judges 
must master, assuming for the purposes of argument that greater mastery 
of precedent would foster consistency and coherence.193 For e.xample, 
appellate judges would have to track the identical quantity of precedent 
that they now monitor to mimimize intracircuit inconsistency and 
identify potential conflicts requiring Circuit Division resolution. Thus, 
the probable effects of the divisional plan are unclear. 
How the Circuit Division would operate in practice is also uncertain, 
partly because federal courts have never actually applied the measure. 
For instance, the notion of inconsistency that triggers the mechanism's 
application is imprecise and may even resist definition, 194 while the 
Circuit Division's power to articulate circuit law is also not clearly 
delineated. Moreover, the device could significantly delay the disposition 
of cases in which it is invoked and might increase friction among judges 
in the circuit. These phenomena and others, such as the Circuit 
Division's composition, mean that the technique may be vulnerable to 
criticism for the same reasons that opponents use to attack the limited en 
bane procedure.195 Furthermore, the assignment of California's districts 
to different divisions could have detrimental effects, such as fostering 
192. See, e.g., Charles A. Wright, The Law of Federal Courts 10-13 (5th ed. 1994); John Minor 
Wisdom, Requiem for a Great Court, 26 Loy. L. Rev. 787, 788 (1980). But see Commission Report, 
supra note 1, at 44-45. ' 
193. Commission Report, supra note 1, at 29, 34-35. Mastery, in the sense of reading all opinions 
issued, may not enhance consistency and coherence as much as modern computerized research. No 
empirical data correlate pre-publication circulation of opinions to the courts' judges with increased 
consistency or coherence. Moreover, no empirical data correlate circuit size with increased 
consistency or coherence. 
194. See, e.g., Hellman, supra note 52, at 541; see also McKenna, supra note 27, at 93-98; 
Arthur D. Hellman, By Precedent Unbound: The Nature and Extent of Unresolved Intercircuit 
Conflicts, 56 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 693 (1995). 
195. The limited en bane procedure consists of the chief judge and 10 other circuit judges chosen 
essentially by lot who rehear appeals to secure or maintain uniformity and to resolve issues of 
exceptional importance. Fed. R. App. P. 35(a); see also 9th Cir. R. 35; Pub. L. No. 95-486, 92 Stat 
1633 (1978); Commission Report, supra note 1, at 32. Circuit-splitting proponents argue that "a 
panel only slightly larger than a third of the court's full judgeship complement contravenes the very 
concept of an 'en bane' court." See Commission Report, supra note 1, at 35. But see id. at 45-49 
(justifying Circuit Division measure). 
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inconsistent interpretations of California substantive law and forum 
shopping, which the Circuit Division may not fully ameliorate. 196 
It is important to remember that the Ninth Circuit experimented with 
and rejected an approach analogous to divisions twenty years ago. 
Former Chief Judge James Browning testified before the commission 
that the court's judges unanimously decided to discontinue testing five 
months after its institution because they ''thought there were discrepancies 
developing among the decisions" in the three geographic areas and "there 
was a real loss of collegiality."197 Application of the divisional system 
could correspondingly limit large circuits' beneficial aspects, such as 
diversity, in terms of caseload novelty and complexity as well as 
viewpoints, geography, race, and gender, that twenty-eight active judges 
can offer.198 
The commissioners perceptively recognized that Congress might 
reject adjudicative divisions and decide to restructure the Ninth 
Circuit. 199 Searching for feasible approaches to reconfiguration and 
characterizing the task as daunting, the commission analyzed more than a 
dozen models and found them all meritless. The commissioners, 
however, examined the three plans that they considered worthy of 
argument, but ultimately concluded that each was flawed and prescribed 
none. Commission treatment of this issue, through the good faith 
exploration of viable options, and its determinations are justifiable. 
Others have conducted similar assessments and reached analogous 
conclusions that the court defies practicable realignment.200 
2. Structural Options for All the Courts of Appeals 
The structural alternatives that the commission proffered for all of the 
appeals courts require comparatively limited examination here.201 First, 
196. Commission Report, supra note I, at I; see also supra notes 20, 33-34 and accompanying 
text 
197. Testimony Before the Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of 
Appeals of James Browning, Circuit Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (May 29, 
1998) (on file with author). But see Commission Report, supra note I, at 50 (suggesting how new 
''proposal differs fundamentally" from experiment described). 
198. See supra notes 176-82 and accompanying text. Similar considerations would apply to the 
use of adjudicative divisions in appeals courts other than the Ninth Circuit 
199. Commission Report, supra note I, at 54-57. 
200. Id.; see also, e.g., Baker, supra note 3, at 945-49; Tobias, supra note 78, at 242-45; see also 
Hruska Commission, supra note 14, at 234-42 (analyzing various approaches). 
201. Commission Report, supra note I, at 60-62. 
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the concept of divisions as applied to the Ninth Circuit received rather 
extensive evaluation above, and the same analysis should apply to the 
other circuits. Second, quite a few institutions and federal courts 
observers have scrutinized the benefits and disadvantages of two-judge 
and district court appellate panels.202 Nonetheless, some exploration of 
these ideas is warranted her~ because it will inform understanding of the 
concepts. 
The commission's development of adjudicative divisions and its 
proposal that Congress empower regional circuits to employ two-judge 
panels and DCAPs in certain cases astutely recognize variations among 
the courts and that lawmakers must afford them much flexibility to 
address future situations. More specifically, the commissioners' 
suggestion that individual circuits fashion divisional plans tailored to 
their circumstances and that the Ninth Circuit recommendation serve as a 
single model properly aclmowledge and provide for the realities that 
these courts may have diverse needs and might want to respond 
differently. 203 
The prescription of two-judge and district court appellate panels also 
aclmowledges that circuits require flexibility, particularly in conserving 
scarce judicial resources. Both forms of panels would save the time that 
appellate judges devote to those appeals designated for special treatment, 
and DCAPs would capitalize on the greater capacity that now exists at 
the district court level.204 However, many current trial court judges who 
would serve on district court appellate panels were appointed principally 
for their trial court expertise and might not "review rigorously, and find 
erroneous, rulings" of peers who may be close professional or personal 
colleagues.205 Moreover, reliance on DCAPs could necessitate the prompt 
confirmation of numerous new district judges.206 Each kind of panel 
might also affect the justice dispensed by, for example, permitting 
202. See, e.g., Long Range Plan, supra note 29, at 131-32; McKenna, supra note 27, at 133-39; 
Martha Dragich, Once a Century: Time for a Strnctural Overhaul of the Federal Courts, 1996 Wis. 
L. Rev. 11, 58-62; Louis Pollak, Amici Curiae, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 811, 825-26 (1989). 
203. Commission Report, supra note 1, at x-xi. 
204. See Dragich, supra note 203, at 59; Tobias, supra note 12, at 1278-79; see also Jon 0. 
Newman, 1000 Judges-The Limit for an Effective Federal Judiciary, 16 Judicature 187 (1993). 
205. Tobias, supra note 13, at 403-04. I realize that most district judges have or secure appellate 
court expertise and many could now ably discharge the error-correction function envisioned. 
206. See McKenna, supra note 27, at 138; Baker, supra note 3, at 952. Securing confirmation of 
district court nominees is easier. See Neil A. Lewis, Bush Picking the Kind of Judges Reagan 
Favored, N.Y. Times, Apr. 10, 1990, at Al; see also Carl Tobias, Choosing Federal Judges in the 
Second Clinton Administration, 23 Hastings Const L.Q. 741, 752 (1997). 
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increased error in the categories of cases delineated. However, the 
commission proposals provide for instances in which the decisionmakers 
on two-judge panels disagree and for discretionary appeals court review 
ofDCAP determinations.207 
Subject to the above caveats, the commissioners may have predicted 
accurately that these approaches together will permit the circuits to 
address continued docket growth and to maintain the appellate process's 
quality and decisional consistency, assuming the courts have the requisite 
resources. 208 If the Ninth Circuit were to experiment with adjudicative 
divisions relatively soon, the concept's efficacy could be evaluated and 
indicated refinements instituted in time for the other courts to profit from 
this testing. The commission's assumption that Congress will appropriate 
sufficient funds for the circuits to operate effectively is a critical, yet 
troubling, one209 because it may not reflect the political reality of future 
legislative budgeting processes. 210 
3. Structural Consequences Involving Appellate Jurisdiction 211 
The commissioners' recommendation that Congress await the results 
of the Judicial Conference study before considering direct appellate court 
review of bankruptcy determinations is reasonable. 212 The commission 
demonstrated that permitting direct review might additionally burden the 
regional circuits without improving the quality of decisionmaking. The 
commissioners' intimation that discretionary appellate jurisdiction would 
not be appropriate today appears convincing. Few persuasive reasons 
support this reform, which would alter the time-honored notion that 
207. Commission Report, supra note 1, at 62-66; see also supra note 203. 
208. Commission Report, supra note l, at xi. 
209. Seeid. 
210. See William H. Rehnquist, 1997 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary (1997); see also 
Linda S. Mullenix, The Counter-Reformation in Procedural Justice, 77 Minn. L. Rev. 375, 379-82, 
399-400 (1992); William H. Rehnquist, Seen in a Glass Darkly: The Future of the Federal Courts, 
1993 Wis. L. Rev. l; Tobias, supra note 207, at 753. 
211. I explore only tersely here the structural ramifications that implicate appellate jurisdiction. 
The issues raised by direct appeal of bankruptcy decisions, by making general appellate jurisdiction 
discretionary, and by enlarging the Federal Circuit's jurisdiction have been ventilated elsewhere 
rather thoroughly, while the commission proffered no affirmative suggestions respecting the latter 
two propositions. Commission Report, supra note l, at 67-68 (noting that National Bankruptcy 
Review Commission studied bankruptcy system for several years); Baker, supra note 21, at 234-38 
(discussing discretionary jurisdiction); supra note 7 (analyzing Federal Circuit). 
212. Commission Report, supra note 1, at 57-61. 
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parties deserve at least one appeal in the federal system.213 The 
commission's assessment of expanding the Federal Circuit's duties to 
include appellate resolution of tax and social security cases without 
tendering particular suggestions seems defensible.214 These two prospects 
have, already received analysis, and Congress would probably be 
responsive to the concerns of specialized practitioners and litigants in the 
fields involved. 
C. Summary by Way of Critique 
The commission carefully studied the federal appellate courts and 
compiled a report and recommendations that complied with its statutory 
mandate; however, it did not complete the extensive evaluation of the 
system that is warranted at this important junctl;Jre. For example, the 
commission gathered very little empirical data on the Ninth Circuit and 
the other appeals courts. The commissioners employed only a skeletal 
staff and enlisted the assistance of few personnel in the Federal Judicial 
Center and the Administrative Office. They also did not spend very much 
of the generous $900,000 budget appropriated for the commission's 
work, or capitalize on readily available resources, such as law professors, 
who might have collected and analyzed instructive empirical information. 215 
The commissioners proposed that Congress prescribe adjudicative 
divisions without clearly ascertaining that fundamental reform was 
actually necessary or that the solution recommended would in fact work 
by systematically assembling, assessing, and synthesizing the maximum 
quantity of relevant empirical material to support this proposal. The 
commission failed to establish conclusively that the Ninth Circuit was 
slowly or ineffectively deciding appeals, producing insufficiently 
consistent or coherent circuit law, or inefficaciously performing its en 
bane function. The commissioners also did not demonstrate definitively 
that the implications of the size of the court's geographic jurisdiction for 
213. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1994); Baker, supra note 21, at 234-38; see also Commission Report, 
supra note 1, at 57-61; Robert M. Parker, Jr. & Ron Chapman, Jr., Accepting Reality: The Time for 
Adopting Discretionary Review in the Courts of Appeals Has Arrived, 50 SMU L. Rev. 573 (1997). 
214. Commission Report, supra note 1, at 72-74. 
215. See Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 305(b), 111 Stat 2491, 2492 (1997); see also Commission 
Report, supra note 1, at 72-74; Paul Elias, Final 9th Circuit Study Calls for Three Divisions, 
Recorder, Dec. 31, 1998, at 3 (reporting that commission spent $500,000). I only mean to suggest 
that the commission might have productively used more of the budget than it did, not that the 
commission failed to spend profitably the money that it did use or .should have been profligate. 
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regionalism, federalism, and effective court operations or its magnitude 
for collegiality are troubling, much less problematic enough to require 
major change. Instead, the commission relied substantially on the ideas 
that smaller decisionmaking units would foster uniformity, predictability, 
and collegiality, that more efficacious en bane procedures and the Circuit 
Division would guarantee greater consistency and coherence in circuit 
law and that the recommended divisional structure would rationalize 
appellate courts' regionalizing and federalizing responsibilities to 
support the divisions suggested. That proposal would divide the court of 
appeals, if not the circuit. In the end, it remains unclear that this 
divisional organization would afford the expected benefits because the 
federal courts have never implemented the system.216 
In fairness, the commission probably achieved as much as could 
reasonably be expected during the exceedingly short time frame 
Congress provided. For example, the commissioners did accumulate and 
analyze some empirical information and showed that expanding 
caseloads are now and may be sufficiently troubling to deserve 
remediation. The commission correspondingly submitted recommen-
dations, namely for divisions and two-judge and district court appellate 
panels, that would ameliorate difficulties, such as delayed resolution, 
attributable to docket growth. The commissioners also recognized that a 
few suggestions, primarily the divisional arrangement, could have 
detrimental side effects and, thus, called for the concepts' testing and 
evaluation over a specific period. The commission provided for 
considerable flexibility by proposing sequential experimentation with 
divisions and urging that Congress authorize, rather than require, circuits 
to effectuate most measures, including special panels. Insofar as the 
commissioners' efforts are vulnerable to criticism, a more appropriate 
target would be Congress which, for instance, only accorded the 
commission a year to complete an enormous task with a relatively 
ambiguous charge. 
216. See Commission Report, supra note 1, at 72-74. Similar ideas apply to the proposals 
regarding two-judge panels and DCAPs. For instance, the commission did not clearly show that the 
circuits face difficulties that require remediation. However, docket growth adversely affects 
resolution in numerous circuits and, thus, the panels would be responsive by saving appellate judges' 
resources. 
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IV. SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE 
Congress and the federal appellate courts should carefully consider the 
report and recommendations issued by the Commission on Structural 
Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals and effectuate those 
suggestions that will enable the appellate system and indhridual circuits 
to resolve cases expeditiously, efficaciously, and equitably. Lawmakers 
and courts might defer somewhat to the expert, independent entity that 
Congress authorized because the commissioners spent a year scrutinizing 
the appeals courts and developing a report and proposals for their 
improvement. Legislators and judges should consult the broadest 
spectrum of potential remedies for the difficulties that the courts 
currently face and will confront, while simultaneously tailoring solutions 
to the specific problems of each circuit. Members of Congress and the 
judiciary should proceed cautiously, as the courts' futures are at stake. 
For example, to the extent that lawmakers or judges entertain doubts 
regarding the complications that circuits do or will experience, the 
precise impacts of commission recommendations or the effectiveness of 
particular approaches, they should defer action, consider additional 
study, or institute experimentation before implementing irrevocable 
remedies such as a circuit split.217 
A. Congress 
Because the evidence on which the comrmss1oners relied did not 
conclusively demonstrate that caseload growth is sufficiently troubling to 
deserve remediation, or that the divisional or panel arrangements would 
be improvements, Congress should seriously consider several possible 
courses of action. The House and the Senate, through their respective 
judiciary committees, may want to scrutinize the commission's report 
and suggestions or solicit greater public input, especially from appeals 
217. I principally address Congress because it must fmplement most of the commissioners' 
suggestions and the courts can effectuate only a few. However, the Judicial Conference of the United 
States, the policymaking arm of the federal courts, and the Judicial Councils, the governing entities 
in the circuits, as well as individual appellate and district judges should review and comment on the 
commission's proposals. These institutions and jurists are peculiarly well-equipped to predict how 
the measures will work in practice, while the courts' cooperation will be crucial to successful 
application of any reforms that Congress adopts. The Conference, however, has limited authority to 
bind the circuits with respect to most of the commission recommendations, but the Conference over 
which the Chief Justice presides and whose members include each circuit's Chief Judge could speak 
persuasively to many proposals. The Councils might implement a few suggestions. See 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 331-32 (1994). 
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court judges and users, on this work. The committees could also 
independently examine the matters that the commissioners analyzed. 
Moreover, members of Congress might employ the recently introduced 
bills that embody the commission's recommendations, and the measures 
could serve as vehicles for evaluating the relevant issues, reassessing the 
commissioners' findings, and refining their suggestions.218 Absent further 
study, efforts to ascertain whether the commission properly determined 
that docket growth in the Ninth Circuit and other courts is problematic 
enough to merit treatment will prove inconclusive. Without additional 
study, attempts to determine whether the solutions that the commission 
proffered would be efficacious will similarly be inconclusive.219 
These propositions mean that Congress may want to authorize 
experimentation with techniques that could address increasing caseloads 
and the difficulties that led to the commission's recommendations. This 
testing should continue for sufficient time in enough contexts to ascertain 
the efficacy of those concepts. The preferable approach might be to 
approve Ninth Circuit testing of a divisional structure modeled on the 
commission proposal, as appropriately refined, and to encourage 
experimentation in some appeals courts with other mechanisms, such as 
two-judge and district court appellate panels. Testing of additional 
measures, including bankruptcy appellate panels and expanded Federal 
Circuit jurisdiction, should also be considered. More specifically, the 
divisional concept could be implemented for seven years, as the 
commissioners recommended, in the Ninth Circuit. Two-judge panels or 
DCAPs might correspondingly be instituted for a similar period in 
circuits, namely the Fifth and Eleventh, that are encountering significant 
docket growth. Congress could empower the Federal Circuit for an 
analogous time to experiment with tax or social security appeals, while 
some appellate courts that have not employed BAPs may want to 
implement them voluntarily.220 An expert, independent entity, such as the 
218. Congress, which commissioned the year-long study, will be reluctant to appear as if it is 
second-guessing the commission or may prefer deferring to the expert, independent entity, although 
senators who disagree with commission findings or suggestions are unlikely to accede. 
219. Illustrative of the type of studies needed is Professor Hellman's meticulous analysis of 
consistency and related issues for more than a decade. See, e.g., Hellman, supra note 52; Hellman, 
By Precedent, supra note 195. 
220. BAPs may be the only measures that courts can adopt without congressional authority. See 
supra note 181 and accompanying text. Ninth Circuit divisions could arguably be vouched through 
the 1978 statute prescribing measures for large circuits. See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
However, the controversial nature of the authority question and the significant character of the 
change suggest that clear congressional authorization is preferable. 
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RAND Corporation, must rigorously analyze this testing by systematically 
collecting, assessing, and synthesizing the maximum amount of dependable 
empirical information.221 Once that experimentation has occurred and 
received careful. evaluation, it should be possible to delineate more 
precisely those problems that the appeals courts are experiencing that 
deserve long-term treatment and to identify the most efficacious solutions 
for the complications designated. Congress then can pass legislation, if 
warranted, to implement any permanent changes that are indicated. 
Lawmakers may wish to examine the institution of additional actions. 
Because most circuits have faced rising caseloads but have possessed 
inadequate resources to address them, and many of the courts will 
probably confront similar circumstances in the future, Congress could 
invoke several responses. First, it might analyze ways to reduce the 
number of appeals by, for instance, limiting federal civil or criminal 
jurisdiction, an approach that retired Justice White and Judge Merritt 
proposed.222 However, legislators probably will not restrict federal 
jurisdiction;223 therefore, they must evaluate means of responding directly 
to docket expansion. For example, Congress could augment resources in 
the form of more judgeships or increased staff. 224 It might also explore a 
broad spectrum of structural and non-structural measures for treating 
caseload growth.225 
Finally, if lawmakers remain uncertain about the commission's 
findings or suggestions, they may want to authorize additional study of 
the system or specific courts. The commission admirably discharged its 
substantial responsibilities in a brief period; however, the lack of time 
and other restraints might have prevented the entity from completing the 
type of thorough analysis that may be needed. Congress, accordingly, 
221. Illustrative are studies of federal civil justice reform. See, e.g., James S. Kakalik et al., An 
Evaluation of Judicial Case Management Under the Civil Justice Reform Act (1996); James S. 
Kakalik et al., Implementation of the Civil Justice Reform Act in Pilot and Comparison Districts 
(1996); see also Commission Report, supra note 1, at 40 (proposing FJC study). 
222. See supra notes 170-73 and accompanying text; see also Long Range Plan, supra note 29, at 
134; McKenna, supra note 27, at 141-53. 
223. See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, Administering Justice in the First Circuit, 24 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 
29, 34-37 (1990); Kathleen F. Brickey, Criminal Mischief: The Federalization of American 
Criminal Law, 46 Hastings L.J. 1135 (1995); Dragich, supra note 203, at 16-17. 
224. See Baker, supra note 21, at 202; see also Carl Tobias, Federal Judicial Selection in a Time 
of Divided Government, 47 Emory L.J. 527 (1988); Tobias, supra note 78, at 235. 
225. For comprehensive treatment of these measures, see Baker, supra note 21, and McKenna, 
supra note 27. 
315 
Washington Law Review Vol. 74:275, 1999 
might consider extending the commission's life or authorizing another 
assessment, which would build on its work in the near term. 
B. The Courts 
The Judicial Conference should carefully review and respond to the 
commission's report and recommendations. The Conference might 
accord some deference to the commissioners and should solicit the views 
of particular appellate and district judges who will be familiar with the 
courts' circumstances and how to treat them. More specifically, the 
Conference ought to decide whether implementation of, or experimentation 
with, divisions and two-judge or district court appellate panels is advisable 
systemwide or in individual circuits. If the entity concludes that 
effectuation or testing of divisional or panel arrangements is indicated, it 
should identify courts based on diversity of case complexity, docket size, 
and judicial resources to apply the measures most productively. 
The Conference might also formulate positions on the three issues 
related to appellate jurisdiction that implicate structure. For example, the 
entity could ascertain whether the commission's opposition to direct 
bankruptcy appeals is appropriate. 226 The Conference may wish to 
consult the work of the National Bankruptcy Review Commission 
because this group called for congressional approval of direct appeals. 227 
However, it appears preferable for the Conference to await the results of 
the study that it recently commissioned. The Judicial Conference could 
also consider the propriety of making appellate review discretionary.228 
However, that prospect has received thorough discussion within and 
outside Congress for several decades, and modifying appeal of right 
would contravene a venerated tradition in American jurisprudence. The 
Conference, as well, might develop positions on the advisability of 
enlarging the Federal Circuit's jurisdiction to encompass tax or social 
security cases or experimenting with appeals in either of those areas.229 
The Judicial Conference must seriously evaluate the recommendation 
of Judge Merritt and retired Justice White on diversity jurisdiction 
226. See Commission Report, supra note 1, at xi, 57-74; see also supra text accompanying notes 
160-65. 
227. See Commission Report, supra note 1, at 72-74. 
228. See id. at 70-72. 
229. See supra note 165 and accompanying text The Conference ought to seek the views of the 
court's judges and attorneys and parties who pursue these cases. 
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because jurisdiction was arguably within the statutory mandate, and 
application of the commissioners' idea could alleviate the pressures that 
appellate courts are experiencing. 230 The Conference might formulate a 
position on this issue, although Congress has rejected similar proposals 
that would limit diversity jurisdiction since 1945.231 
The Judicial Councils in the circuits ought to consider many of the 
commission's suggestions that involve particular appeals courts. For 
example, the Ninth Circuit should closely examine the commissioners' 
divisional proposal and may want to fashion a position on whether 
immediate implementation or experimentation is preferable, although the 
commission's recent recommendation would essentially facilitate testing. 
In response to issues that the Commission raised, Chief Judge Hug 
appointed an Evaluation Committee to analyze the Ninth Circuit and 
report suggestions for improvement.232 The council ·might specifically 
suggest that divisions receive experimentation and rigorous assessment 
for some period after which Congress could decide on the concept's 
broader application. Restricted testing and expert analysis should 
indicate whether the divisional approach warrants permanent adoption in 
this court and extension to other circuits. The remaining councils may 
wish to determine whether divisions or two-judge or district court 
appellate panels deserve effectuation or experimentation in their circuits. 
The councils could also develop positions on the propriety of direct 
bankruptcy appeals and of making appellate jurisdiction discretionary, 
while the judges of the Federal Circuit could evaluate the wisdom of 
enlarging the court's jurisdiction. 
The collliriission carefully assessed the circuits and made constructive 
suggestions in the brief time available. However, the Judicial Conference 
and individual courts should undertake more examination. For example, 
greater scrutiny might reveal felicitous means of expediting appeals that 
have applicability systemwide or to specific circuits. In the foreseeable 
future, it also appears that docket growth will continue but that the courts 
will have few additional resources for treating cases. The Conference and 
230. Commission Report, supra note 1, at 78-79; see also supra text accompanying notes 170-73. 
231. See Commission Report, supra note 1, at 78-79. 
232 Media Release, Chief Judge Hug Appoints Evaluation Committee and Releases Analysis of 
White Commission's Proposal to Divide the Court of Appeals into Three Divisions (Mar. 10, 1999), 
available in <http:\\www.ce9.uscourts.gov/web/OCELibra.nsf/504ca249c786e20f85256284006da7 
ab/a56e24f2c74c4f2588256730005b6dab?OpenI>ocument>. 
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the circuits, therefore, should continue evaluating the courts' situations 
and experimenting with promising measures. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of 
Appeals recently completed a study of the appellate system and issued a 
report and recommendations that could influence the courts' destiny in 
the twenty-first century. The commissioners admirably discharged their 
serious responsibility in the short period that Congress provided. 
Members of Congress and the federal judiciary must closely analyze the 
commission's work and implement those ideas which will improve the 
system. To achieve effective reforms in the appellate courts, the 
Congress and the judiciary should experiment with the commission's 
proposed reforms before they institute permanent structural changes. The 
diverse characteristics of each circuit require flexible approaches that are 
tailored to the specific court's circumstances. Moreover, the lack of 
compelling empirical evidence warranting change may well suggest the 
need for additional study. 
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